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Abstract
Was the collapse of world trade between 1928 and 1937 caused by higher transport costs,
increased protectionism or the collapse of the gold standard? Using recent advances in the
estimation of gravity equations, I examine the partial and general equilibrium effects of bilateral
distance, international borders, and the payment system on trade. My results suggest that had
average tariff and non-tariff trade barriers remained at their 1928 level, total international trade
would have been 64.6% higher in 1937. Had the gold standard not collapsed in 1931 and had the
British Empire not departed to establish its own currency and trade blocs, international trade
would have been 3% larger. Finally, had transport costs remained at their 1928 level, global
trade would not have been significantly different nine years on. These results are supported by
over 6,000 new hand-collected observations of ad-valorem ocean freight rates for cotton, which
show an average increase of only 1.2 percentage points between 1928 and 1936. When expressed
as an index, the movement of freight rates mirrors the evolution of the elasticity of trade to
distance over the period.
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1 The Tariff Menace
In 2016, the Brexit referendum and the U.S. presidential election of Donald Trump indicated that
the globalization of the last decades might be coming to an end. These fears seemed to be confirmed
in 2018, when the U.S. imposed tariffs on solar panels, aluminum, steel, and washing machines from
most countries including its closest trading partners. These tariffs caused retaliation from many
countries and fears are mounting that U.S. - China relations might escalate into a large-scale trade
war. The increased trade tensions and the threat of a shift away from a multilateral trading system
forced the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to revise downwards its World Economic Outlook
for 2019. In the eyes of the IMF (2018) the “intensification of trade tensions, and the associated rise
in policy uncertainty, could dent business and financial market sentiment, trigger financial market
volatility, and slow investment and trade. Higher trade barriers would disrupt global supply chains,
[...] lowering global productivity and [harming] low-income households disproportionately.”
Many observers point to the risk of returning to a 1930s beggar-thy-neighbor trade policy.1
Strikingly, anti-globalization rhetoric and policies have increased only recently even though global
trade has already been slowing down since 2012. Because protectionist policies were not put in
place after the disruption of the 2008 financial crisis, economists were initially looking for other
explanations for the stall in world trade growth. Economists looked at the dramatic collapse of
world trade in the 1930s to draw conclusions about the causes of deglobalization. Estevadeordal et al.
(2003) explore the causes of the collapse of world trade during the interwar period. They argue that
because productivity growth in the shipping sector was slower than average total factor productivity
(TFP) growth, real transport costs rose in the interwar period. To explain the contemporary trade
stagnation, Krugman (2016) popularized Estevadeordal et al.’s (2003) interpretation, arguing that
higher transport costs were the main determinant in the collapse of world trade in the 1930s.
Independently of whether one can apply this argument to the present period of trade stagnation,
it is worth looking at the interwar period again, which has historically been associated with rising
tariff and non-tariff trade barriers rather than with rising transport costs. Estevadeordal et al.
(2003) present increased protectionism, the collapse of the international payment system and rising
transport costs as possible causes of the collapse of world trade in the 1930s. This paper takes a fresh
look at the three candidates. It makes use of recent advances in the workhorse model of international
trade, the gravity model that seeks to explain bilateral trade flows. Changes in the partial effects
of distance, borders and the payment system are estimated for a sample of 36 countries and the
resulting trade cost function is incorporated into a full endowment general equilibrium (GE) model,
which allows me to revisit the horse race of Estevadeordal et al. (2003).
My regression results suggest that the border effect, which measures the thickness of international
borders and serves as a proxy for average bilateral tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, had increased
by 89% between 1925 and 1937. At the same time, there was no significant change in the trade-
reducing effect of bilateral distance. The trade-increasing effect of the gold standard was relatively
small. Being on gold increased members’ bilateral trade by only 9% and this effect is relativized
when taking into account the potentially trade-increasing effects of the trade and currency blocs that
1See for example Stephens (2018)
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followed the collapse of the gold standard. Indeed, my gravity model, which controls for the average
effect of de-globalization, provides evidence that one trade bloc, the imperial preference system
(IPS), and one currency bloc, the sterling bloc, increased bilateral trade among their members. This
contrasts with previous studies, which find that no trade or currency bloc in the 1930s increased
trade. The finding that the trade-increasing effects of the IPS and the sterling bloc are large, positive,
significant and free from reverse causality has an important implication: The economic benefits that
could be reaped from a retreat into empire, made Britain’s exit from the multilateral trade and
payment system, the gold standard, less severe than for other countries.
My specification of the structural gravity model also serves to explore the seemingly paradoxical
result of a declining elasticity of trade to distance that previous studies have found, despite rising
transport costs during the interwar period. My results support previous explanations for the distance
puzzle, which argue that commercial and financial policies increasingly dominated the effect of
distance, but also stress the heterogeneity of tariff rates between trading partners. The “simple”
solution to the post-war distance puzzle proposed in the international trade literature is not sufficient
to solve the interwar distance puzzle. Instead, it requires the inclusion of a large and significant
effect of the IPS, indicating preferential tariff rates between the British Empire and its dominions, to
get an unbiased coefficient of distance as a trade cost factor. Only after the inclusion of the empire
effect can transport costs be reasonably proxied by the distance elasticity, suggesting that the IPS,
agreed upon at the Ottawa conference in 1932, was successful in defying gravity, i.e. making the
physical trade cost of distance relatively less important.
The estimated partial effects yield the trade cost function, which is incorporated into a full
endowment GE model. Analyzing three different counterfactual scenarios in the GE model is akin
to Estevadeordal et al.’s (2003) horse race and allows me to answer the following questions:
• What would have been the level of world trade in 1937, had the gold exchange standard not
collapsed into a system of trade and currency blocs?
• What would have been the level of world trade in 1937, had tariff and non-tariff trade barriers
remained at their 1928 levels?
• What would have been the level of world trade in 1937, had transport costs remained at their
1928 level?
The results suggest that if transport costs had remained at their 1928 level, trade in 1937 would
have been 19% lower. This effect is however not significantly different from zero. Had the gold
standard not collapsed and had the IPS and the sterling bloc not formed, global trade would have
been merely 3% larger in 1937. But had average tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, as proxied
by the border effect, not increased after 1928, world trade would have been 64% larger in 1937.
These results contrast sharply with the results of Estevadeordal et al. (2003), the only study to date
that quantifies the individual contributions of tariffs, transport costs and the payment system. My
results provide quantitative estimates that reestablish the conventional narrative that protectionism
was the culprit of the interwar trade bust.
To support my results, I present additional evidence on real transport costs during the interwar
period. I manually collected high-frequency data on cotton freight rates from New York along 21
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routes from 1925 to 1936, which I deflate by the product price in New York to get ad-valorem freight
rates. The data imply only a marginal increase in ad-valorem freight rates. On average, real freight
rates increased by less than two percentage points between 1925 and 1936. This lends support to
the regression results I obtain from estimating the gravity model.
Finally, I match the real freight rates with the quantities shipped to the destinations. This
allows me to create a Laspeyres index, which is an additional contribution to the interwar shipping
literature, which until today had relied exclusively on the Isserlis-index. Contrary to the Isserlis-
Index, my new cotton freight index covers different shipping routes and is based on freight rates for
the liner industry. It tracks historical events such as the coal strike of 1926 well and shows an increase
of 50% between 1925 and 1936. More importantly, my transport cost index mirrors the movement
of the distance elasticity from the gravity model. Both, the index and the distance elasticity, shoot
up during the Great Deflation of 1929-1933, which I attribute to cartelization, rather than to a
productivity slowdown in the shipping sector. Future research could delve into the question of the
role that the sharp increase in real transport costs around 1931 played in the initial trade bust.
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2 Gravity Between the Wars: The Empire Adrift
For international trade economists, the contraction of world trade during the first phase of the Great
Depression is remarkable, both in absolute and relative terms to GDP. From 1929 to 1933, world
exports in constant prices fell by 35%. When output started to recover, it was not followed by
international trade, and in 1937 real volume of world trade was barely 95% of its 1928 level.2 What
caused this collapse in international trade?
A major factor of the trade bust was the fall in world income, but again this cannot explain
the low level of trade after income had recovered. The period was also marked by a surge in
protectionism following the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff imposed by the U.S. in 1930. But tariffs
are only one of several factors that increased the costs of trade between countries. The financial
crisis in continental Europe in summer of 1931 marked the beginning of the collapse of the gold
standard and was followed by devaluation, the introduction of capital controls and the formation of
new currency blocs. This collapse of the multilateral payment system is seen as an important factor
in its own right, separately from tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. A third potential factor is an
increase in real transportation costs (Irwin, 2011).
Estevadeordal et al. (2003) innovatively investigated the relative impact of these three factors by
using a gravity model.3 Of the six percentage point decline in the trade-to-GDP ratio between 1929
and 1938 they attribute 29% to the collapse of the payment system, 27% to higher transport costs
and only 14% to higher tariffs. Arguing that the interwar trade collapse was caused more by higher
shipping costs than by rising tariffs earned them a reputation as revisionists (Jacks et al., 2011).
Albers (2018) challenges Estevadeordal et al.’s (2003) finding by estimating a gravity model for
twelve consecutive years from 1925 to 1936 to determine the elasticity of trade with respect to
distance. He confirms an earlier finding by Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) of a rise in the coefficient
of distance from 1929 onwards. Since the distance elasticity is negative, a rise (decrease in absolute
value) means that distance becomes less important as the world enters the depression phase. Because
distance becomes less important at a time when real transport costs are rising, Albers (2018) names
his finding the “interwar distance puzzle” referring to the postwar distance puzzle in the meta-
study of Disdier and Head (2008). Albers (2018) considers that his finding means that tariffs were
becoming a more important factor in determining trade relative to transport costs. Since the effect
of tariffs outweighs the effect of transport costs, the relative importance of distance diminishes.
This is in line with the interpretation of Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) who argue, “that commercial
and financial policies increasingly dominated the effects of geography”. Following Disdier and Head
(2008), I analyze all studies that provide distance coefficients for individual years of the interwar
period. Figure (1) plots the coefficients of the main regression of each study over time. We indeed
observe a significant decline in the absolute value of the distance-coefficient.
Another recent study by Fouquin and Hugot (2016a) estimates the distance elasticity as yearly
2Statistics in this paragraph are computed from table D.14 in Federico and Tena Junguito (2016), which shows
world exports in constant 1913 USD.
3Another study that quantitatively investigates the trade collapse is Madsen (2001), who argues that approximately
41% of the world trade collapse over the period 1929 to 1932 can be attributed to tariff and non-tariff trade barriers,
and the rest is due to declining incomes. However, Madsen (2001) only deals with the immediate depression period
and does not consider transport costs or the collapse of the payment system as possible causes.
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Figure 1: The Interwar Distance Elasticity Puzzle
Notes: This figure plots the distance coefficients of four studies (Albers, 2018; Eichengreen and Irwin, 1995, 1998;
Irwin and Tervio¨, 2002) over time.
repeated cross sections from 1827 to 2014. While their paper does not present any numerical results,
their figure 18 shows that the distance elasticity has roughly the same value in 1938 as in 1920. This
stands in stark contrast to the studies in figure (1).4
Recent research has solved the postwar distance puzzle by incorporating internal trade and
internal distance into the gravity model. Yotov (2012) argues that the puzzle had persisted because
previous studies estimated international trade costs relative to other international trade costs, when
one should instead measure international relative to intranational trade costs. A bias in the distance
coefficient could arise, for example, if a country unilaterally increased its tariffs. Nearby economies
previously exporting to this country would redirect some of their exports to more distant countries.
A regression that does not include intranational trade then sees the effect of international distance
decline.5
4Unfortunately, the estimation strategy by Fouquin and Hugot (2016a) is not completely clear. For example, they
do not seem to use a balanced sample, but instead have a different number of observations for each year. However,
Fouquin and Hugot (2016a) include internal trade and the border effect in their regression, which is part of the solution
to the distance puzzle as discussed below.
5Where trade flows are redirected to and how strong this bias is depends on exporters’ and importers’ trade
openness, their economic size and market integration, or their location in the world economy (see e.g. the discussion
in Liu and Meissner (2015)). Moreover, a change in trade policy or transportation costs affects countries differently
depending on their product mix (see appendix (A.1)). Finally, variations in productivity lead to variations in the
extensive margin. If a change in trade policy or transport costs affects the fixed costs of exporting, heterogenous effects
arise in the extensive margin of trade (Chaney, 2008). Such heterogeneity across countries of a changing distance
elasticity has also been observed by Borchert and Yotov (2017) who suggest the inclusion of a set of country-specific
fixed effects for internal trade. As discussed below, I deal with such problems by adopting the estimation strategy of
Bergstrand et al. (2015).
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Internal trade is also included in Bergstrand et al. (2015) who estimate a panel version of the
gravity model from 1990 to 2002. Their model allows to control for unobserved heterogeneity across
country pairs by including a set of country-pair fixed effects. They also include a dummy variable
for international borders that captures the average decrease (or increase) in tariff and non-tariff
trade barriers or more generally the average effect of globalization (or deglobalization). Because
Bergstrand et al. (2015) provide the best solution for the post-war distance puzzle to date, I follow
their econometric strategy to measure changes in the distance elasticity in the interwar period. This
approach should provide us with a good proxy for real transportation costs. Still, I find that the
distance elasticity has fallen over the course of the 1930s even after controlling for international
borders.
The state-of-the-art features of the gravity model are also indispensable to get an unbiased es-
timate for dummy variables that measure the effect of trade agreements, currency unions or other
economic integration areas (Bergstrand et al., 2015). Including these specifications is an improve-
ment over earlier studies of the interwar period such as Gowa and Hicks (2013), who investigate the
system of trade and currency blocs that evolved after the collapse of the gold standard, or Jacks
(2014), who asks whether Canada was able to divert trade flows towards members of the IPS agreed
upon at the Ottawa conference in 1932. Gowa and Hicks (2013) find that no bloc increased or
decreased trade among its members, and also Jacks (2014) finds that Canada was not able to defy
gravity and divert trade flows towards members of the IPS. Because these studies do not include
internal trade, they are not able to account for the effect of deglobalization which increases internal
trade relative to international trade. The absence of accounting for this effect biases the estimate
for trade and currency blocs downwards. Controlling for deglobalization, I find that the IPS is eco-
nomically and statistically significant. Moreover, there is enough evidence to suggest that sterling
bloc membership increased trade between members. Including these two blocs is essential to get an
unbiased estimate of distance that proxies transport costs. These results lend support to a recent
study by De Bromhead et al. (2019) who argue that the discriminatory trade policies of the British
Empire and its dominions were a significant factor in shifting trade towards the empire. In that
sense, it is no surprise that the interwar distance puzzle is resolved once we control for the IPS
and sterling bloc. Following the Ottawa conference in 1932, the British Empire decoupled itself and
drifted away from the rest of the world. The breakaway of the empire from the rest of the world
effectively decreased the relative distance between the empire and its dominions, while decreasing
the relative distance between countries of the rest of the world. Overall, the preferential tariff rates
and the many exceptions granted to the dominions on non-tariff barriers rendered distance relatively
less important as a trade cost.
Equipped with a complete trade cost function, I conduct GE static exercises to analyze the
individual contributions of transport costs, the multilateral trade and payment systems, and tariff
and non-tariff trade barriers to the global trade bust.
This paper contributes to three strands of the literature. First, my results are a vindication of
Bergstrand et al.’s (2015) proposed solution to the distance elasticity puzzle, which goes beyond
Yotov’s (2012) inclusion of intranational trade and suggests that ignoring the effects of economic
integration areas, or blocs, biases the coefficient on distance. Second, it contributes to the debate on
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the system of trade and currency blocs in the 1930s by showing that the IPS and the sterling bloc
were successful in shifting trade towards their members. Third, and most importantly, my results
question the existence of a rise in real transport costs and challenge the findings of Estevadeordal
et al. (2003). This study supports the more conventional explanation for the interwar trade collapse:
protectionism.
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3 Interwar Gravity Redux
This section first deals with the theoretical foundation of the structural gravity model and then
uses the model to estimate the direct, or partial, effects of distance, international borders and the
payment system on international trade. Finally, I use the resulting trade cost function to perform
GE analysis in three counterfactual scenarios.
3.1 Methodology and Data
Since the 1960s, trade economists have used the “gravity equation” to provide econometric estimates
for the effects of distance, national borders, currency unions, and other measures of trade costs on
bilateral international trade flows. It is only in the last two decades that the gravity model has
evolved from a simplistic analogy with Newtonian physics to the workhorse model of international
trade.
The early 2000s saw a gravity revolution caused by the influential works of Eaton and Kortum
(2002) and Anderson and Van Wincoop [AvW] (2003), who endowed the gravity equation with micro-
foundations. Eaton and Kortum (2002) derive the gravity equation from a Ricardian supply-side
framework, while AvW derive the gravity model from a demand-side Armington (i.e. CES-National
Product Differentiation) framework. Although the starting points of these two studies are radically
different, they arrive almost at the same results. Indeed, Arkolakis et al. (2012) have shown that
the gravity equation can be derived not only from an Armington and Ricardian framework but from
an even wider range of trade models, including models in the spirit of Krugman (1980) and Melitz
(2003). The present study uses the Armington framework in the tradition of AvW to analyze the
impact of different trade costs on world trade during the interwar period. However, Allen et al. (2014)
have recently developed a universal gravity framework with sufficient conditions for the existence
and uniqueness of the trade equilibrium for a wide class of GE models including AvW. Therefore,
the macroeconomic conditions inherent in the gravity trade model impose sufficient structure so that
its particular microeconomic details do not pose a problem in its characterization.
The model considered in this study consists of N countries, where each country produces a
variety of goods that is traded with all other countries. Denoting the fixed supply of each good with
Qi and the factory-gate price with pi, the value of production, or income, in country i is defined
as Yi = piQi. Aggregate expenditure is defined as Ei = φiYi, where φi is an exogenous parameter
defining the relation between the value of output and aggregate expenditure, such that when φi > 1,
country i faces a trade deficit, while country i runs a trade surplus when 1 > φi > 0. The complete
gravity model that explains exports (Xij) from country i to j is described in equations (3.1) to
(3.5).6 Πi and Pj are structural terms which AvW call outward and inward multilateral resistance
terms. τij is the trade cost factor between i and j, σ is the elasticity of substitution and αi is the
CES preference parameter.
6For a full derivation of the micro-founded gravity model from an Armington framework the reader is directed
to AvW’s original article or one of the guides and handbooks on the topic. The most recent guide on the gravity
model on which the present study draws extensively is Yotov et al. (2016). Equations (3.1 - 3.5) and the estimation







































Ei = φiYi = φipiQi (3.5)
Equation (3.1) represents the theoretical gravity equation that governs bilateral trade flows and
consists of a size term YiEj and a trade cost term (τij/PjΠi)
1−σ
. At the heart of the structural gravity
model are the multilateral resistance terms Pj and Πi, AvW’s key innovation, that differentiates the
theory-founded gravity models from the earlier ones. These remoteness terms, which represent the
importer j’s and exporter i’s ease of market access, have to be controlled for to get an unbiased
estimate of the partial effect of any factor within the trade cost function when estimating the gravity
model econometrically. The theory-founded gravity model then includes trade with all N trading
partners of country i including country i itself. Not including intranational trade will result in biased
estimates of any partial effect of trade costs since it ignores the effects of trade diversion (Bergstrand
et al., 2015). These trade diversion effects work through the multilateral resistance terms and arise
because the more integrated country i is with a particular trading partner j, the more remote it
becomes relative to all other countries. Because previous studies of the interwar period did not
incorporate internal trade, this is the first study to estimate a properly specified theoretical gravity
model for the interwar period.
Moreover, any counterfactual analysis, that is performed to examine a change in trade costs
between i and j using the partial effect only, as in Estevadeordal et al. (2003), ignores feedback
effects affecting other countries. This drawback can be overcome using the GE analysis framework
operating via the multilateral resistance channels, captured by equations (3.2) and (3.3). Whereas
the partial effect is captured by adjusting bilateral trade costs τij while keeping output, expenditure
and multilateral resistance terms constant, the conditional GE effects allow for adjustment in the
multilateral resistance terms.
The channel described in equations (3.4) and (3.5) endogenizes the value of output and expendi-
ture by allowing factory-gate prices to respond to trade cost changes. Analyzing a change in trade
costs, the full endowment GE then takes into account the associated feedback effects in multilateral
resistances, via equation (3.4), and then translates the changes in factory-gate prices into changes
in the value of domestic production and aggregate expenditure, via equation (3.5).7
7An implicit assumption in this paper, as in all standard gravity models, is that the trade cost function is exogenous
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In the following subsections, the structural gravity model will be used to evaluate the impact
of changes in transport costs, the payment system and political trade barriers on world trade.
Section (3.2) makes use of recent econometric advances to estimate the partial effects of distance,
international borders and the payment system. Equipped with a complete trade cost function τij,
section (3.3) then solves the complete GE model in equations (3.1) to (3.5) for the year 1937 and
compares it with three counterfactual scenarios (CF 1 - 3) in which specific trade costs are assumed
to have remained at their 1928 level. This will answer the following questions:
CF 1: What would have been the level of world trade in 1937, had the gold exchange standard not
collapsed into a system of trade and currency blocs?
CF 2: What would have been the level of world trade in 1937, had tariff and non-tariff trade barriers
remained at their 1928 levels?
CF 3: What would have been the level of world trade in 1937, had transport costs remained at their
1928 level?
Performing a complete GE analysis representative of world trade requires data on bilateral trade,
geographical variables such as distance, gold standard and bloc membership, and internal trade for a
large number of countries. To construct the dataset, I draw on a number of existing data sources, the
most important of which is Fouquin and Hugot (2016b). Although the past two decades have seen
substantial improvements in data for the interwar period, obvious data limitations are still present.
The primary difficulty is that for the model to be closed it requires N ∗N observations per year (i.e.
a quadratic matrix of trade relationships between the N trading partners). This presents the risk of
missing observations, if one does not want to reduce the number of countries to a non-representative
sample with a geographical bias.
The sample used to estimate the trade cost function to perform the GE analysis in section (3.3)
consists of 36 countries over five interval years and consequently 6480 observations, of which 881
missing observations are assumed to be zero. The total number of observations in the GE sample
that take the value zero is 1038. This is a large number of zeros and some country-pairs do not
report a single positive trade flow for any year. This causes 390 observations to be dropped from the
estimation and in order to get the baseline trade cost function for these country pairs, I apply the
two-step procedure suggested by Anderson and Yotov (2016). Fortunately, the restriction of N ∗N
observations can be abandoned in the estimation of the partial effects. This allows me to estimate
the trade cost function with more confidence. The estimation of the trade cost function is robust to
using the more rigorous partial sample.
Three variables are used to estimate the partial effects of transport costs, tariff and non-tariff
trade barriers, and the payment system: distance, international borders and gold standard or cur-
rency bloc membership. Some authors have argued that distance and borders hinder trade much
more than transports costs or tariffs can explain. In particular, Grossman (1998) and Head and
Mayer (2013) have argued that distance and borders measure lack of information and home-variety
to income and trade growth. If a negative income shock causes a rise in tariffs, capital controls or other trade barriers,
then the role of trade costs in explaining the fall of world trade could, of course, be weaker. Unfortunately, this is an
issue that remains outside the scope of this paper.
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biased preferences. Here I will make the reasonable assumption that these factors did not change
over the period under study so that any change in the elasticity of distance and the border effect
can directly be interpreted as a change in the trade decreasing effects of transportation costs and
tariff and non-tariff trade barriers.
To determine the partial effect of the collapse of the payment system Estevadeordal et al. (2003)
use an indicator variable that describes gold standard adherence between two trading partners. This
may be overly pessimistic, as I will show, since the gold standard did not collapse into N national
payment systems, but into a system of trade and currency blocs. Contrary to previous studies that
estimated the impact of these blocs, I find that membership of the IPS had a large, statistically
significant, positive effect on trade. Moreover, I provide evidence that sterling bloc membership
increased trade. Controlling for these two blocs in the gravity equation solves the interwar distance
puzzle since it removes the omitted variable bias that stems from the heterogeneity in tariff rates.
After the Ottawa conference, and as a result of preferential tariff rates, it may have been cheaper
for the UK to import goods from far away dominions than from nearby European countries. Since
this is based on the presumption that currency blocs did in fact increase trade between members, I
will provide additional estimates on the partial effects of all trade and currency blocs and test these
blocs for reverse causality.
The last factor in the trade cost function, the border effect, itself will then capture the remaining
international trade costs independent of distance, the payment system and other standard gravity
control variables such as common language, colonial linkage or contiguity. The border effect should
be interpreted as capturing tariff and non-tariff barriers, such as capital controls, quota systems,
restrictions on the use of imported inputs by domestic producers, undue controls at frontiers, and
regulation.
The complete construction of the data, its sources, and sample selection are discussed in detail
in the appendix (A.1).
3.2 Partial Effects
Recent econometric advances in the estimation of the gravity model, discussed in section (2), provide
us with reliable estimates of the partial effects of distance, international borders, and the payment
system. Using a panel of 36 countries and five years (1925, 1928, 1931, 1934, 1937), I estimate the




β1,T ln(Distij,T ) +
1937∑
T=1928
β2,T INTL BRDRij,T ]∗
exp[β3Cbloc+ β4Cbloct−s + β5Cbloct+4 + γi,t + δj,t + φij] + ij,t
(3.6)
The estimation strategy described in (3.6) follows Bergstrand et al. (2015) and estimates a panel
8The Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator accounts for heteroskedasticity bias and allows for
trade flows to be zero. Silva and Tenreyro (2006) have shown that, under heteroskedasticity and due to Jensen’s
inequality, the use of the OLS estimator severely biases the coefficient on distance. Indeed, recent studies estimating
the gravity equation rely almost exclusively on the PPML estimator, as it has been declared best practice in the
gravity literature (Yotov et al., 2016).
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version of equation (3.1). Equation (3.6) includes exporter-year γi,t and importer-year δj,t fixed
effects to account for income and expenditure, endogenous prices, and unobserved time-varying
exporter and importer multilateral heterogeneity. By including a set of country-pair fixed effects φij
we control for unobserved heterogeneity across country pairs.9
The inclusion of time-invariant country-pair fixed effects captures all time-invariant factors, which
means that we cannot estimate the distance elasticity and the border effect. However, we can observe
time-varying changes in these bilateral trade costs by interacting Distij and INTL BRDRij with
a year dummy. The specification in equation (3.6) then allows for different effects of distance and
border in each year T ∈ {1928, 1931, 1934, 1937}. These variables will capture all bilateral factors
that depend on distance and borders influencing trade relative to the base year 1925.
Moreover, I include intranational trade and the variable INTL BRDRij,T , which indicates inter-
national trade, providing us with an estimate of the border effect and also ensuring that we measure
international relative to intranational trade costs. This dummy variable, which takes the value of
one for international trade (i 6= j) and zero for intranational trade (i = j), accounts for average
increases across countries in unobservable export costs that decrease international trade relative to
intranational trade. We expect the coefficient of this variable to be negative and increasing over
time, capturing the effects of increasing capital controls, tariffs and other non-tariff trade barriers.
Finally, the variable Cbloc indicates whether two countries are on the gold standard or members
of one of following trade or currency blocs: the sterling bloc, gold bloc, U.S. dollar bloc, Reichsmark
bloc, exchange-control bloc, reciprocal trade agreements act (RTAA) or the IPS.
Indeed, the principle reason to use a panel approach is to get unbiased estimates for the gold
standard and the trade and currency blocs. At least since Baier and Bergstrand’s (2007) criticism,
authors have been including country-pair fixed effects that control for potential endogeneity of trade
agreements, currency areas or any form of economic integration area. All authors who investigated
the interwar bloc system have confirmed the presence of strong endogeneity in these blocs. Eichen-
green and Irwin (1995), Gowa and Hicks (2013) and Wolf and Ritschl (2011) all concur that the blocs
are endogenous to preexisting trade flows among their members, reflecting rather than increasing
their trade. However, equation (3.6) is an improvement over previous studies since it includes all
features considered best practices in the gravity literature (Yotov et al., 2016).
First, I control for the border effect by including the variable INTL BRDRij,T . Bergstrand
et al. (2015) have shown that the estimator of postwar currency unions is biased upward because
it captures the average effects of globalization. Applied to the interwar period, the bloc dummy
would be biased downward, capturing the average effect of deglobalization. Including the border
dummy isolates the effect of trade and currency blocs on bilateral trade to determine how much a
bloc increased trade between two members, but at the same time controls for increasing trends in
unobservable bilateral trade costs that decreased international trade relative to intranational trade.
Second, I give trade flows the opportunity to adjust in a three-year interval. Trade policy changes
will not be instantaneous and it is best practice among economists to give trade flows three to five
years to adjust. Because the use of interval years comes at the cost of a decreased time variation, I
9Unless otherwise stated, I estimate equation (3.6) by using the fast PPML command provided by Larch et al.
(2017) and limit pair fixed effects to be symmetric (i.e. φij = φji)
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also estimate the model using data for all 13 years as a robustness check.
Third, as a further robustness check I allow for nonlinear effects of currency blocs to capture the
possibility of the effects of blocs changing over time. This is done by including various lags (Cbloct−s)
in the specification. There are two economic reasons why we should include lags. First, the bloc
dummy is constructed using the dates of entry and exit. Academic debates over these dates put
aside, it is reasonable to expect that the full economic effect of an exit from the gold standard or the
entry into a new trade or currency bloc is felt only sometime after the event. Second, the collapse of
the multilateral payment system into regional blocs alters the terms of trade and as is well known
from the literature in international economics, terms-of-trade changes tend to have lagged effects on
trade volumes.
Finally, I test whether the specification, through the inclusion of pair fixed effects, properly
accounts for possible “reverse causality” between trade and bloc formation. I implement an easy
test to assess the “strict exogeneity” of currency blocs by adding a new variable capturing the future
level of currency blocs. A lead variable Cbloct+4 (4 years) of the bloc dummy is included in the
specification to test for reverse causality. In the panel context here, if currency bloc changes are
strictly exogenous to trade flow changes, CBloct+4 should be uncorrelated with the concurrent trade
flow.
Table (1) presents the results from estimating different variants of equation (3.6). Column (1)
shows the result for the main specification using the GE sample. The first thing to note is that
the coefficient on distance is insignificant for all years except 1931. Because I control for any
unobservables at the bilateral level by including pair fixed effects, this means that the distance
coefficients describe the change in the distance elasticity relative to 1925.10 Since the distance
elasticity is negative, a negative coefficient in table (1) implies an increase (in absolute value) in
the distance elasticity relative to 1925. The coefficient on Distij,1931 in column (1) implies that the
effect of distance had increased by 7.5% (100 ∗ (e0.0725 − 1) in 1931.
The second finding is a very large and increasing border effect. The coefficient on INTL -
BRDRij,1937 implies that, all else being equal, the trade-decreasing effect of international borders
had increased by 89.6% (100 ∗ (e0.64 − 1) in 1937 relative to 1925.
The third finding in column (1) is that the coefficients on Goldij,t, SterlingBlocij,t and IPSij,t
are large and significant. These coefficients state that being on gold increases trade between two
members by 9.2% on average (100 ∗ (e0.088 − 1), sterling bloc membership increases trade by 13%
(100 ∗ (e0.122− 1) and IPS membership increases trade by 21% (100 ∗ (e0.191− 1). This is the baseline
trade cost function that I use in the GE analysis in the next section. As discussed in section (3.1),
the GE sample assumes a large number of missing observations to be zero. The remainder of this
subsection therefore uses the partial sample, which lets us estimate the gravity model with more
confidence.
Column (2) reestimates the main specification with the partial sample. The only difference in
the estimated coefficients is the coefficient on sterling bloc membership, which is now insignificant.
10The pair fixed effects control for initial distance and border effects. As described in section 3.1, we assume that
some factors do not change during this short time period. In that sense, the pair fixed effects control for much
heterogeneity including nonlinearities in transport costs, impediments to information flows and home-variety biased
preferences.
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Table 1: Estimation of the Interwar Trade Cost Function
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PPML PPML PPML PPML PPML
VARIABLES Xij Xij Xij Xij Xij
ln(Distij,1928) -0.0156 -0.0164 -0.0152 -0.0162 -0.0211
(0.0275) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0132)
ln(Distij,1931) -0.0725** -0.0734** -0.0607** -0.0619** -0.0762***
(0.0351) (0.0288) (0.0271) (0.0270) (0.0249)
ln(Distij,1934) 0.0353 0.0328 0.0439 0.0701** 0.0630**
(0.0284) (0.0281) (0.0281) (0.0273) (0.0280)
ln(Distij,1937) 0.0600 0.0556 0.0671* 0.0947*** 0.0915**
(0.0368) (0.0368) (0.0369) (0.0360) (0.0373)
INTL BRDRij,1928 -0.0627 -0.0624* -0.0625* -0.0572 -0.00905
(0.0612) (0.0369) (0.0370) (0.0374) (0.0335)
INTL BRDRij,1931 -0.289*** -0.289*** -0.302*** -0.296*** -0.232***
(0.0839) (0.0705) (0.0686) (0.0686) (0.0585)
INTL BRDRij,1934 -0.669*** -0.671*** -0.680*** -0.709*** -0.718***
(0.0635) (0.0692) (0.0703) (0.0719) (0.0723)
INTL BRDRij,1937 -0.640*** -0.633*** -0.644*** -0.675*** -0.698***
(0.0897) (0.0937) (0.0947) (0.0970) (0.0988)
Goldij,t 0.0876** 0.0878** 0.0836** 0.0773**
(0.0397) (0.0342) (0.0339) (0.0346)
SterlingBlocij,t 0.122* 0.124
(0.0690) (0.0761)
IPSij,t 0.191** 0.194** 0.247***
(0.0826) (0.0921) (0.0846)
Observations 6,090 5,085 5,085 5,085 5,085
Sample GE Partial Partial Partial Partial
Country Pair Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All estimates are computed with data for the years 1925, 1928, 1931, 1934 and 1937, and use
exporter-time, importer-time and pair fixed effects. Column (1) uses the PPML command, while all other
estimations use the fast PPML command provided by Larch et al. (2017). All pair fixed effects are restricted
to be symmetric (i.e. φij = φji). The estimates of fixed effects are omitted for brevity. Standard errors are
clustered by country pair in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
14
This suggests that there is no market difference when using the more rigorous partial sample. The
justification for including the two bloc variables SterlingBlocij,t and IPSij,t can be seen in columns
(3) to (5). Excluding these two blocs in the specifications in column (4) and (5) changes the
coefficient on distance, which now takes positive values for the years 1934 and 1937. For example,
the coefficient onDistij,1937 in column (4) suggests that the elasticity of trade to distance had declined
by 9.9% (100 ∗ (e0.095 − 1) relative to 1925. This is a striking result since it means that distance
was significantly less important as a trade cost in 1937 than in any other year in the sample, even
though transport costs are said to have risen over the course of the interwar years. Importantly,
this estimate is not biased by any other average increase in trade costs such as a general rise in
tariff levels, which would render distance relatively less important. The decline in absolute value
of the coefficient on distance has been observed by Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) and named the
interwar distance puzzle by Albers (2018) since it resembles the post-war distance puzzle described
by Disdier and Head (2008). Both Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) and Albers (2018) have argued
that political trade barriers caused the decline in the distance elasticity. Contrary to these authors, I
include intranational trade and a dummy for international borders, thereby measuring international
relative to intranational trade costs while at the same time controlling for the average effect of
deglobalization (i.e. the average increase in tariff and non-tariff trade barriers). This strategy has
proved to be a solution to the post-war distance puzzle (Yotov, 2012; Yotov et al., 2016). In that
sense, the results presented in columns (4) and (5) in table (1) should provide a solution to the
interwar distance puzzle and the fact that the puzzle is not resolved indicates an omitted variable
bias.
The puzzle is resolved once we add IPS and sterling bloc membership in columns (3) and (2).
Controlling for these two blocs is important in order to get an unbiased estimate of the distance
elasticity. Preferential tariff rates within the empire and fixed exchange rates between sterling bloc
members rendered distance within these blocs (and consequently also between non-members) less
important. I therefore include sterling bloc membership in the trade cost function although the
coefficient on SterlingBlocij,t in column (2) is just not significant at the 10% level.
This solution to the interwar distance puzzle is robust when extending the partial sample to
include all 13 years, interacting the pair fixed effects with a time trend, using asymmetric pair fixed
effects or using lagged variables for the bloc dummies (see appendix (A.2)). Because of the large
number of fixed effects and variables to be estimated with a relatively small number of observations,
compared to post-war trade studies, I also estimate the gravity model by excluding the pair-fixed
effects and including traditional gravity covariates such as colonial ties (see A.3). Here again, we
observe the disappearance of the distance elasticity puzzle once we include sterling bloc and IPS
membership. Moreover, in many specifications in the robustness appendix, the coefficient on sterling
bloc membership is significant at the 10% level. Overall, the results presented in table (1) and the
choice of the trade cost function are robust to the various specifications.
The decision to include IPS and sterling bloc membership in the regressions in table (1) is based on
the regression results in table (2), which show that these blocs are the only ones that are significant
and not subject to reverse causality. Table (2) uses equation (3.6) to estimate the effects of the
currency blocs. We drop Distij,t and Goldij,t for simplicity, but include INTL BRDRij,t to control
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for the average effect of deglobalization. Column (1) includes the trade blocs IPS, exchange control
bloc, RTAA and the gold bloc, column (2) includes the currency blocs sterling bloc, Reichsmark
bloc, gold bloc and dollar bloc, and column (3) includes all blocs. RTAA, gold bloc and dollar bloc
are insignificant in all specifications and are excluded from further analysis.
Column (4) tests the remaining four blocs for reverse causality by including a four-year lead
variable for each bloc. These lead variables should be insignificant in the absence of any reverse
causality. The test suggests that only the IPS and the sterling bloc are free from potential endo-
geneity issues. Although the sterling bloc dummy is insignificant in columns (3) and (4), I include it
in the trade cost function for two reasons. First, adding the gold standard dummy, lags of the bloc
variables, and distance drastically improves the significance of the sterling bloc (see the appendix
(A.2)). Second, including sterling bloc membership in the trade cost function solves the distance
puzzle as we saw in table (1).
Overall, the results suggest a strong trade-increasing effect of the IPS that is economically and
statistically significant in all specifications. This stands in contrast to the results obtained by Gowa
and Hicks (2013) who find that not a single bloc increased member trade. Instead, my results support
De Bromhead et al. (2019) recent finding that the IPS was successful in shifting trade towards the
empire. More importantly, the results warrant the use of the variable in the regressions presented
in table (1). To answer the question of how much the collapse of the gold standard contributed to
the collapse of world trade in the 1930s, one needs to consider deducting the trade-increasing effect
of these blocs, since without the collapse of the gold standard, the IPS and the sterling bloc might
not have formed.
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Table 2: Trade and Currency Blocs in the Interwar Period
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PPML PPML PPML PPML
VARIABLES Xij Xij Xij Xij
INTL BRDRij,1928 -0.0528*** -0.0541*** -0.0539*** -0.0793***
(0.0155) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0195)
INTL BRDRij,1931 -0.390*** -0.397*** -0.404*** -0.430***
(0.0282) (0.0294) (0.0284) (0.0309)
INTL BRDRij,1934 -0.630*** -0.549*** -0.570*** -0.581***
(0.0362) (0.0435) (0.0437) (0.0441)
INTL BRDRij,1937 -0.556*** -0.467*** -0.491*** -0.504***
(0.0420) (0.0433) (0.0444) (0.0442)
SterlingBlocij,t 0.133** 0.0692 0.102
(0.0654) (0.0674) (0.0756)
IPSij,t 0.331*** 0.228*** 0.212***
(0.0755) (0.0755) (0.0735)
ExchangeControlBlocij,t 0.0643 0.265*** 0.318***
(0.0740) (0.0797) (0.0808)
















Observations 5,085 5,085 5,085 5,084
Country Pair Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All estimates are computed using the partial sample and the years 1925, 1928, 1931,
1934 and 1937. All regressions include exporter-time, importer-time and pair fixed effects. The
estimates of fixed effects are omitted for brevity. All regressions are estimated using the fast
PPML command provided by Larch et al. (2017) and pair fixed effects are restricted to be
symmetric (i.e. φij = φji). Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by country pair; ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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3.3 General Equilibrium Analysis
The analysis so far has focused solely on partial effects of distance, borders and the payment system.
Using the gravity model in equations (3.1) to (3.5) I now undertake a quantitative general equilibrium
(GE) comparative static exercise to get a complete evaluation of the impact of changing trade costs
on the interwar trade bust.
As discussed in the previous section, a large part of trade data is missing or equal to zero for a
given pair over the whole period of investigation. This makes it impossible to identify and obtain the
estimates of the complete set of pair fixed effects, which are used to construct bilateral trade costs.
I deal with the issue by adopting the two-stage procedure proposed by Anderson and Yotov (2016).
First, I estimate my preferred specification of the gravity model in order to obtain the estimates
of the bilateral fixed effects ( φij ) for country pairs with at least one non-zero trade flow. The
estimation results for this regression are shown in column (1) of table (1). For these observations,
the following trade cost function is calculated for the year 1937 as the baseline scenario:
τBLNij,1937 = exp(φˆij + 0.06 lnDistij,1937−0.64 ∗ INTL BRDRij,1937)∗
exp(0.088 ∗Goldij,t + 0.191 ∗ IPSij,t + 0.122 ∗ SterlingBlocij,t)
(3.7)
In the second step, I regress the estimates of pair fixed effects on distance, contiguity, colonial
linkage, common language, the border dummy, and exporter and importer fixed effects:
φˆij = exp[α1 ∗ lnDistij + α2 ∗ Contig + α3 ∗ Colonial + α4 ∗ ComLang]∗
exp[α4 ∗ INTL BRDRij + γi + δj] + ij
(3.8)
The predicted pair fixed effects from this second stage regression are used to fill up the missing
pair fixed effects in order to construct the complete set of bilateral trade costs that can then be
used as the baseline scenario in the counterfactual analyses. I now reestimate the gravity model
constrained with the complete set of bilateral trade costs for the year 1937. The estimates of the
exporter and importer fixed effects from this regression are used in order to construct all baseline
values of the inward and outward multilateral resistance terms, which in turn are used in combination
with data on output and expenditure to obtain the GE indices of country i’s overall trade in the
baseline.
Next, we define three counterfactual scenarios (CF), which translate into three counterfactual
trade cost functions. The first CF assumes that the gold standard, in its 1928 form, still existed
in 1937 and that the IPS and sterling bloc had not formed. The conditional GE is achieved by
reestimating the econometric gravity specification for the year 1937 under the following constraint
Xij = exp[0.06 lnDistij,1937 +−0.64 ∗ INTL BRDRij,1937]∗
exp[0.088 ∗GoldCFij,1928 ∗+γCFi + δCFj + φˆij] + CFij
(3.9)
18
where the bloc variables now take their 1928 values. The CF then describes a scenario where gold
standard adherence had remained at its 1928 level and the IPS and sterling bloc had not formed.
The predicted volume of trade from regression (3.9) is used to calculate country i’s counterfactual
conditional GE trade volume (XˆCFi =
∑N
j=1
XˆCFij for all j 6= i). The new set of estimates of exporter
and importer fixed effects from specification (3.9) and the constrained coefficients of the trade
cost variables are used to construct the corresponding conditional GE multilateral resistances and
obtain real GDP estimates for each of the 36 countries in the sample.11 Finally, the effects of
the full endowment GE are obtained by implementing a four-stage iterative procedure that allows
for endogenous factory-gate prices, income, expenditure and trade to adjust to the counterfactual
shock. The value for the elasticity of substitution is 7, which we take from the literature.12 A
detailed description of the calculation of the GE effects is summarized in appendix (A.3).
The second CF assumes that the trade-decreasing effect of borders had not changed in 1937
relative to 1928. Hence, we constrain the coefficient on INTL BRDRij,1937 to take its 1928 value
(-0.063). The third CF constrains the coefficient on lnDistij,1937 to be equal to -0.016, the coefficient
for 1928. Table (3) presents the results and shows how each country’s total trade (in 1937 prices)
would have changed under each of the three CF scenarios. The two lines at the bottom of the table
show average change across countries and change in total trade aggregated over all 36 countries,
which represent the counterfactual change in world trade.
The results are striking and show a clear winner of the horse race. Had the average level of
tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, as captured by the border effect, not changed relative to 1928,
world trade would have been 64.6 % larger. Crossing the finish line second is the collapse of the
gold standard. Had countries remained on the common payment system and had the sterling bloc
and IPS not formed, trade would have been 3 % larger. Finally, transport costs, as captured by
distance, is not last but has to be disqualified as a cause of the great trade collapse since it ran off
in the opposite direction. Had the distance elasticity remained the same, total trade would have
been 19% lower on average. Since the baseline and counterfactual trade costs in this last CF are
calculated with insignificant coefficients on the distance elasticty (see section (3.2)), the GE effects
in CF 3 are likely to be zero.
There is a significant amount of variation of the impact these CF scenarios would have had across
countries. A lower border effect would have benefited South Africa most, roughly doubling her trade.
Great Britain, Italy and France would also have seen above average trade increases. Germany and
the U.S., on the other hand, would have seen relatively small increases in their aggregate trade
had borders remained at their 1928 level. The gold bloc countries (France, Belgium, Netherlands,
Switzerland and Italy) and most of Latin America would have particularly benefited, had the gold
standard not collapsed. Finally, we observe that, with the exception of Canada, the trade-increasing
GE effect in CF 1 is negative for Great Britain and its colonies and dominions. This means that the
trade-increasing effect of the IPS and sterling bloc outweighed the negative impact of the collapse
of the gold standard for those countries.
11I only present total exports. Other indices are available upon request.
12The criteria of convergence are set so that either the standard errors or maximum of the difference between two
iterations of the factory-gate prices are smaller than 0.01. All three scenarios in table (3) have also been calculated
with an elasticity of substitution of 5, another common value in the literature. The results did not significantly change.
19
Table 3: General Equilibrium Comparative Statics
Country
CF 1: Gold CF 2: Border CF 3: Distance†
CDL GE Full GE CDL GE Full GE CDL GE Full GE
ARG 2,49 2,52 46,51 48,94 -13,53 -20,83
AUS -6,06 -6,79 50,28 51,96 -14,42 -21,83
AUT 8,02 7,97 71,15 71,17 -10,27 -16,08
BEL 7,87 7,86 61,47 61,94 -11,32 -16,58
BGR 4,37 4,82 26,30 31,07 -7,44 -14,20
BRA 8,93 8,81 73,90 73,31 -15,89 -22,44
CAN 1,64 1,48 54,45 56,67 -6,46 -14,32
CHE 9,09 8,86 74,89 73,52 -12,32 -17,51
CHL 4,01 4,69 35,39 40,17 -9,21 -17,64
COL 9,09 9,03 75,26 75,14 -16,19 -22,09
DEU 6,94 7,06 57,94 59,04 -8,83 -15,26
DNK 2,01 1,86 64,42 64,30 -10,43 -15,99
EGY 2,47 2,34 59,56 59,83 -16,40 -22,00
ESP -0,29 -0,38 80,60 77,79 -12,81 -18,65
FIN 2,26 2,20 53,26 54,76 -11,08 -17,30
FRA 9,86 9,46 82,34 79,33 -11,71 -17,55
GBR -3,93 -4,02 80,53 78,36 -18,10 -23,15
GRC 9,61 9,33 78,97 77,09 -18,52 -23,26
GTM 8,25 8,35 68,20 69,49 -20,64 -25,57
HND -0,05 -0,02 65,09 66,52 -15,47 -21,22
HUN 5,44 5,85 48,38 51,79 -6,57 -13,07
IDN 5,00 5,25 46,42 49,40 -12,73 -20,25
IND -4,72 -5,28 55,95 57,09 -13,42 -20,51
ITA 9,97 9,57 84,26 81,44 -13,50 -19,25
JPN -0,03 -0,12 76,35 75,22 -17,41 -23,02
KOR -0,05 -0,14 73,85 72,31 -13,78 -19,00
MEX 9,66 9,45 82,01 80,58 -12,87 -19,31
NLD 8,49 8,46 66,62 66,91 -11,27 -16,57
NOR 2,84 2,59 81,62 78,70 -12,58 -18,14
NZL -11,73 -12,51 50,68 51,69 -18,91 -25,28
PRT -5,48 -5,54 78,74 75,66 -16,04 -21,12
SWE 3,10 2,96 64,53 64,60 -10,30 -16,42
URY 6,96 7,14 57,77 59,05 -18,46 -24,44
USA 6,39 6,53 57,55 59,18 -10,27 -18,09
YUG -0,28 -0,41 48,56 51,43 -7,49 -14,00
ZAF -13,01 -12,66 101,76 94,01 -27,95 -31,80
Country Average 3,03 2,96 64,88 64,99 -13,46 -19,55
Aggregate Change 3,03 2,95 64,39 64,58 -12,59 -18,98
Note: This table reports the GE trade effects of changing three components of the trade cost function in equation (3.7). The
first scenario (CF 1) assumes that the gold standard had not collapsed and the IPS and sterling bloc had not formed. The
second scenario (CF 2) assumes that the border effect had remained at its 1928 value, and the third scenario (CF 3) assumes
that the distance coefficient had remained at its 1928 value. For all three scenarios, I report two different trade impacts: the
conditional GE trade impact (CDL GE), which takes changes in the multilateral resistances (MR) into account, but holds GDPs
constant; and the full endowment GE trade impact (Full GE), where MRs and GDPs adjust. The row “Country Average”
shows the arithmetic average of the GE effects of all countries and the bottom line “Aggregate Change” states the total impact
on aggregated trade.
† CF 3 is computed using insignificant coefficients. Hence, the GE effects are also insignificant.
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These results are robust to the use of different parameters and counterfactual scenarios. I per-
formed the same GE analysis above using column (3) in table (1) as the trade cost function, setting
sigma equal to 5 and assuming as a CF that the IPS had formed even if the gold standard had not
collapsed. 13
13For brevity, these results are not shown here, but are available upon request. If anything, these alternative
specifications provide even stronger evidence against transport costs as a cause of the low levels of world trade in
1937.
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4 A New Transport Cost Index
Section (3) established that the distance elasticity increased (in absolute value) in 1931. However,
after 1931 the distance elasticity decreased, so that in 1937 distance did not matter any more than
it did in 1925. If we interpret the distance elasticity as a proxy for transport costs, the estimates
suggest that transport costs rose during the worst years of the Great Depression but then returned
to their pre-depression level. This section compares this result with evidence on real freight rates.
There has been considerable disagreement about the course of transportation costs in the interwar
period (Estevadeordal et al., 2003; Mohammed and Williamson, 2004; Hynes et al., 2012; Albers,
2018). Much of the discussion about transport costs revolves around the Isserlis Index, the standard
source of global freight trends, and the choice of the price deflator. Depending on the frequency of
the data and the choice of the deflator, the Isserlis Index implies rising or falling transport costs.
For example, Estevadeordal et al. (2003), who use the Sauerbeck consumer price index to deflate
the Isserlis index, find rising real freight rates for the whole of the interwar period. However, the
use of the Sauerbeck index is problematic since it includes non-tradable goods. Mohammed and
Williamson (2004) make use of the original source of the Isserlis index, Angier’s annual reports on
British shipping, and construct route-specific deflators. Relative to the 1920s, their real freight rate
index shows a fall between 1930 and 1934 and a rise between 1935 and 1939. Unfortunately, they
only provide five-year averages and we cannot say how much of the increase during the late 1930s was
driven by the year 1939, the start of World War II. A more general caveat concerning the use of the
Angier data is that one relies on freight rates for British tramp shipping to make inferences about the
general evolution of transport costs. Their index ignores the liner shipping industry, which carried
high value articles, whereas tramps carried the high bulk, low value staples. Furthermore, liners,
contrary to tramps, operated on fixed routes and fixed schedules. Therefore, we cannot assume
that Mohammed and Williamson’s (2004) index is representative for the cost of shipping high value
manufactures or for the entire British shipping industry. It also ignores transportation industries
that transported goods on railroads, turnpikes, rivers and planes. Moreover, the Mohammed and
Williamson (2004) index relies heavily on routes to and from Britain and completely ignores shipping
between non-European ports.
Albers (2018) presents new freight data for wheat along four oceanic routes deflated by the
price of the good at the place of origin. Additionally, he presents data on German railway freight
rates deflated by the German wholesale price index. His series imply a modest but economically
significant increase in real transport costs over the period from 1925 to 1936 and a spike around
1931. This mixed evidence calls for further evidence on the development of transport costs in the
interwar period, which I provide with a new index on freight rates for US cotton.
I compiled monthly data on cotton (American middling) freight rates from New York to 21
destinations (for high- and low-density cotton) from the Commercial and Financial Chronicle (1925
- 1936). The data was published at least twice a month and I collected the data that is closest to
the middle of the month.14
I deflate the arithmetic average between high- and low-density nominal freight rates (ct per lb)
14Six routes are not covered for the whole period and either enter the series in 1926 (Venice) or stop reporting
sometime in the 1930s (Lisbon, Oporto, Barcelona, Japan, Shanghai).
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by the monthly price (ct per lb) of middling upland in New York, which I take from the Statistisches
Reichsamt (1936), to get freight rates in ad-valorem terms. Figure (A.2) in the appendix plots these
ad-valorem freight rates for all 21 routes. The graphs show that real transport costs of cotton did
indeed rise during the Great Depression. At the beginning of 1925 ad-valorem rates ranged from
1.5% for Barcelona to 3.3% for Salonica. In 1928 ad-valorem rates ranged from 1.7% to 5% and in
June 1932, at the height of the depression, rates had increased to 6.5% in Le Havre and 15.6% in
Salonica. However, by December 1936 most European rates had fallen to 3% again, while Salonica
stayed at 7.2%. Between 1928 and 1936 average ad-valorem freight rates increased by only 1.2
percentage points. There is a strong positive relationship between these route specific freight rates
and distance. A simple OLS regression suggests that the elasticity of ad-valorem freight rates to
distance is between 0.4 and 0.5 (see table (A.6) in the appendix).
To examine how much transport costs rose when expressed as an index, I weight these routes by




(fn,10.1927 ∗ qn,10.1927) (4.1)
where fn,t is the ad-valorem freight rate from New York to location n in month t and qn,t is the
quantity (as a percentage of the total, i.e.
∑
n
qn,t = 1) exported to location n in month t. Quantities
come from the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce (October, 1927) and I use October 1927
as the base month.15 Figure (2) below depicts the freight index from 1925 to 1936.
The first thing that deserves mention is the spike in the fall of 1926. The index increases by 100
% between mid-August and mid-November. This increase in real freight rates comes at the end of
the British coal strike of 1926, which had started in May that year. After the strike ends, the index
falls again and remains relatively stable until the summer of 1930. The index reaches its peak in
June 1932 at the height of the worldwide deflation and falls sharply afterwards. In 1936 the index
is on average 20 percentage points above the base period (October 1927) and 50 percentage points
higher than the index average in 1925. However, this change is only large if expressed as an index.
As we have seen above, freight rates in ad-valorem terms increased by less than two percentage
points.
A difference of this index when compared with Mohammed and Williamson (2004) is that it
relies heavily on the liner industry and is based on routes from New York to cities in Europe and
Asia.16 The index therefore should serve as a useful supplement to the British tramp shipping index
of Mohammed and Williamson (2004). The drawback of this index is that its construction is based
on only one commodity. It is thus difficult to make judgments about Estevadeordal et al.’s (2003)
different hypotheses on the causes of the rise in shipping costs. On the one hand, real freight costs
rose slightly over the entire period suggesting that productivity growth in the shipping sector was
slower than productivity growth in the cotton sector. On the other hand, estimating the elasticity
15I use exports of unmanufactured cotton and match the export destination country with the destination port in
the freight rate data. Whenever more than one route goes to the same country of destination, I allocate an equal
share of the quantity to each port (e.g., I assume that 50% of cotton exports to Germany arrive in Hamburg and 50%
in Bremen). For Fiume, Piraeus and Salonica I use exports to “other European countries”.
16Liners that operated frequently on these routes include RMS Ascania, RMS Scythia and RMS Aurania of the
Cunard line (see the Commercial and Financial Chronicle (1925 - 1936)).
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Figure 2: Cotton Freight Index
Notes: The graph shows an index of cotton freight rates calculated using the Laspeyres Index for 21 ocean
routes. Data on freights rates, prices and quantities come from the Commercial and Financial Chronicle (1925
- 1936), the Statistisches Reichsamt (1936) and the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce (October, 1927).
of freight rate to distance, a proxy for technology in the shipping industry, shows that this elasticity
is lower in the post- than in the pre-depression period (see appendix (A.4)).
Their alternative explanation for rising shipping costs, rigidities that prevented nominal freight
rates to adjust (e.g. shipping cartels), is clearly visible in figure (2). Overall, the index in figure
(2) and the ad-valorem freight rates along different routes in figure (A.2) are broadly in line with
the data on transport costs by Albers (2018). Furthermore, the large increase in real transport
costs during the extreme deflation, between 1929 and 1933, resembles the increase in the distance
elasticity in 1931 (see section (3)).
How does the evidence on transport costs compare with the regression results in section (3.2)?
The assembled data in this section suggests that transport costs between 1933 and 1936 were not
significantly different from those in the 1920s, at least in any economic sense. Although they may
have contributed to the initial trade bust during the first years of the depression, the marginally
higher level of transport costs, relative to the 1920s, cannot explain the low levels of international
trade still present in the latter half of the 1930s. This is the same result I obtained econometrically
in columns (1) and (2) of table (1), where the change in the distance elasticity in 1937 relative to
1925 is insignificant.
Although insignificant for the preferred specification in table (1) column (2), the coefficient on
Distij,T is actually positive, suggesting that the distance elasticity had decreased by 5.7% (100 ∗
(e0.0556 − 1) relative to 1925. This effect becomes more significant if we use 1928 as the base year or
drop the sterling bloc dummy. How does this more critical interpretation of the regression results
square with the fact that we actually observe a small increase in transport costs?
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A sensible explanation for this is that freight rates themselves do not perfectly describe trans-
portation costs. Transportation of goods involves time, which increases with distance between loca-
tions. Hummels and Schaur (2013) have argued that time in transit is equivalent to an ad-valorem
tariff of 0.6 to 2.1%. Although time as a trade barrier is likely to be more important in the age of
global supply chains, one cannot disregard technological improvements in the transportation indus-
try, the building of highways and the advent of aviation during the interwar period. Indeed, the
regression results in table (A.6) suggest an improvement in the technological relationship between
freight rates and distance over the interwar period.
A second reason why freight rates might not adequately describe the real costs of transportation
is that during the depression, many governments started to subsidize freight costs. In 1933, the U.S.
Secretary of Agriculture (1933) complained to Congress:
Indirect export subsidies are sometimes granted by governments that operate the railways
in their territory in the form of specially reduced freight rates. Reduced rates for export
shipments apply, for instance, to wheat in India, sugar in Germany, corn in Rumania,
and hops in Czechoslovakia.
Naturally, if governments subsidized freight costs, the data on freight rates will not be what
exporters pay to ship their goods. Instead, increasing subsidies on the transportation of goods would
render distance less important as a trade cost, which is precisely what a more critical interpretation
of the regression results in section (3.2) suggests.
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5 Conclusion
This paper revisits the debate about the causes of the collapse of world trade in the 1930s and
examines the relative importance of higher transport costs, the collapse of the payment system, and
increased tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. Using a fully specified gravity equation motivated by
formal theoretical foundations, I estimate the effects of bilateral distance, international borders, and
the payment system on trade.
I show that the gold standard increased trade among its members only by 9.2%. The negative
effect that the collapse of the gold standard into a system of trade and currency blocs had on world
trade is further reduced when we take into account the trade-increasing effects of the IPS and the
sterling bloc. Distance, a proxy for transport costs, did not matter more in 1937 than it did in 1925
and thereby fails to explain the low levels of world trade in the 1930s. The factor that changed
dramatically from 1930 onwards is the border effect. The trade-reducing effect of international
borders captures all trade costs, unrelated to distance (transport costs) or network effects (payment
systems). The border effect then is the combined effect of all commercial and financial policies (e.g.
tariffs, import quotas, capital controls). This already large trade reducing effect, increased by 89%
from 1925 to 1937. Had countries not resorted to beggar-thy-neighbor policies and tariff retaliation
after 1928, world trade would have been 64% larger.
The result that transport costs did not matter for the low levels of world trade in the late 1930s is
supported by new data on ad-valorem freight rates. Shipping cotton on ocean liners was only slightly
more expensive in the late 1930s than in the 1920s and it is unlikely that this marginal increase
was the result of slow productivity growth. Transport costs and the distance elasticity, however,
show strong increases around 1931, a period of severe deflation, which suggests that cartelization
in the shipping industry did in fact matter. In that sense, transport costs might have mattered for
the initial trade collapse at the beginning of the Great Depression. Future research would do well,
in estimating a dynamic macroeconomic model for the years 1929 to 1933 to evaluate the relative
importance of commercial policies, transport costs and credit frictions during these years.
This study also provides a novel contribution to the quest for an unbiased estimate of the distance
elasticity in gravity models. I argue that the retreat into the British Empire decoupled a large part
of the world’s multilateral trade and payment system. Overall, this made distance less important,
relative to other trade costs. Only after I control for the gold standard, the IPS and the sterling
bloc does the evolution of the distance elasticity approximate the evolution of transport costs in the
interwar period. Future work should test whether harmonization of political trade barriers add to
the solution of the post-war distance puzzle.
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A Appendix
A.1 Gravity Data Appendix
I created a dataset by merging two existing datasets. I use the large dataset by Fouquin and Hugot
(2016b) and merge it with the dataset provided by Gowa and Hicks (2013).17 Because I needed
observations for internal trade, I restricted the sample to include countries with observations on
GDP.18 The 36 countries included and their bloc membership are listed in table (A.1).
Table A.1: Countries in both samples and bloc membership
Country Bloc Country Bloc
Argentina St (1934) India St (1931), IPS (1932)
Australia St (1931), IPS (1932) Indonesia
Austria Ex (1931), RM (1932) Italy G (1931-34), Ex (1931)
Belgium G (1931-35) Japan
Bulgaria Ex (1931), RM (1932) Korea
Brazil Mexico
Canada IPS (1932) Netherlands G (1931-36)
Chile Norway St (1933)
Colombia New Zealand St (1931), IPS (1932)
Denmark St (1933) Portugal St (1931)
Egypt St (1931) South Africa St (1931), IPS (1932)
Finland St (1933) Spain
France St (1938), G (1931-36) Sweden St (1933)
Germany Ex (1931), RM (1932) Switzerland G (1931-36)
Greece Ex (1931), RM (1932) United Kingdom St (1931), IPS (1932)
Guatemala United States
Honduras Uruguay
Hungary Ex (1931), RM (1932) Yugoslavia Ex (1931)
Notes: St: Sterling bloc; G: Gold bloc; Ex: Exchange bloc; RM: Reichsmark bloc; IPS: Imperial Preference
System. Data on bloc membership is taken from Gowa and Hicks (2013). Dollar bloc and RTAA membership
is not reported here for brevity.
Next, I constructed two samples, one for the estimation of the partial effects in section (3.2) and
one for the GE analysis in section (3.3), which I call the partial sample and the GE sample. The
partial sample balances the panel, which means that for a given dyad an observation exists for every
year from 1925 to 1937. Because the Fouquin and Hugot (2016b) dataset sometimes also reports
observations with missing trade flows, the partial sample drops the country pairs that report missing
trade flows for all years in the sample. I replaced the remaining 16 observations missing trade flows
with the variable FLOW0, which is equal to zero when it is reasonable to assume that the trade
flow is missing because the trade flow is actually zero.19
17I used the yearly British pounds per dollar exchange rate in Fouquin and Hugot (2016b) to convert the Gowa and
Hicks (2013) trade flows into pound sterling.
18Despite existing data on GDP, I excluded the only communist country, the USSR, from the sample.
19For details on the construction of the variable FLOW0, see Fouquin and Hugot (2016b). The 16 observations
that were replaced with zero are: IND - HND (1925, 1928); PRT - FIN (1937); BGR - IND (1925, 1928, 1937); KOR
- IND (1928, 1931, 1934, 1937); GTM - IND (1931, 1934, 1937); COL - IND (1937); HND - NLD (1925); GTM - NLD
(1925).
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Figure (A.1) shows the geographical distribution of the 1017 dyads in the partial sample. The
sample covers most of Europe and the Americas.
Figure A.1: Geographical distribution of the partial sample
[Print in Color]
Notes: This figure plots the geographical distribution of the sample on a map with current frontiers. The colors
indicate the number of times a country appears in the observations. The partial sample includes 1017 country pairs
from a total of 36 countries over five time periods. The map shows the number of trade relationships of a country in
the sample. For example, Korea appears only in 9 dyads and is depicted in white.
The GE sample is obtained not by dropping dyads with missing observations in a given year,
but instead by adding observations to obtain a quadratic matrix of N ∗N observations per year (i.e.
a quadratic matrix of trade relations between the N trading partners). This consequently results
in 1296 observations per year or 6480 observations for 5 years, of which 881 missing observations
are assumed to be zero.20 These 881 missing observations are primarily country pairs of two distant
small developing countries (e.g. Korea and Honduras) and it is reasonable to assume that these
trade flows are zero or close to zero.
While it is possible to restrict the number of countries to reduce the number of missing observa-
tions, this comes at the cost of biasing the sample towards industrialized nations and reducing the
total number of observations, which creates convergence problems. Note that biasing the sample
heavily towards European countries increases the share of manufactures in aggregate trade as can
be seen in table (A.2), which is taken from Hilgerdt (1942). Manufactured goods made up a larger
share of trade (exports plus imports) of European countries compared to the rest of the world before
and after the Great Depression. This affects the estimation of the distance elasticity through two
channels, the elasticity of substitution and the elasticity of trade costs with respect to distance.21
20Note that the partial sample contains only 5085 observations. This is because the partial sample loses 514
non-missing observations in the process of balancing the panel.
21In a previous version of this paper I estimated the gravity equation in yearly cross-sections for different samples.
One observes that the “distance puzzle” is more pronounced if the sample is restricted to include primarily European
countries (results are available upon request). This has also been observed by Albers (2018). This result has its
analogy in the literature on the post-war distance puzzle. In a recent study, Borchert and Yotov (2017) show that on
average the distance elasticity has fallen between 1986 and 2006, but that low-income countries have not seen a fall in
the distance elasticity. The authors argue that the distance elasticity depends heavily on the composition of exports,
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Table A.2: Percentage Composition of Merchandise Trade by Groups of Countries
Imports Exports
Class 1928 1935 1928 1935
Europe c 32.00 31.33 50.67 50.67
a+b 68.00 68.67 49.33 49.33
Other countries c 57.50 57.14 15.00 16.21
a+b 42.14 42.86 85.00 83.79
Notes: a: Foodstuffs and live animals; b: Materials raw or partly manufactured; c: Manufactured articles;
Source: (Hilgerdt, 1942, Table 7 p.23)
σ is different for the two classes of goods, but the importance of transport costs also differs
between the two classes of goods. Freight rates are usually measured per unit of the good in
question and depend on how bulky the good is. Arguably, the value of a cargo full of manufacture
goods should on average be much higher compared to the value of the same cargo full of primary
products. The share of shipping costs in the price of manufactures should then be much lower than
in primary goods. The elasticity of trade in agricultural goods to transport costs is therefore larger
compared to manufactured goods. It might be that the increase in real freight costs during the
depression hit the trade of primary goods particularly hard.
Moreover, deflation in agricultural and primary products was more severe than in the manu-
facturing sector. Between 1925 and 1936, the export price ratio of manufactures to other goods
increased by 29% (League of Nations, 1938).22 Transport costs increased because real freight costs
increased. It therefore matters that the deflation was more severe in the primary sector.23 Dropping
the countries with fewer observations (Korea, Honduras, Guatemala and Colombia) might therefore
bias the results towards the “tariff explanation”.
Both samples include observations for intranational trade (i.e. how much a country trades within
its own borders). Lacking data on interregional trade or a measure of gross output (subtracting total
exports from gross output would yield intranational trade), one needs another way of constructing a
proxy for internal trade.24 Jacks et al. (2011) simply use the GDP series as a proxy for gross output,
which poses two problems. First, gross output is by construction larger than value-added GDP and
so the use of GDP would lead to an underestimation of domestic trade. Second, as GDP includes
services, which are not covered by the trade data, this leads to an overestimation of domestic trade.
Fouquin and Hugot (2016a) follow a different approach. They scale up their GDP series by a factor
of 3.16, which is the average ratio of gross output to value added from a post-1980 dataset. Here,
I propose a more reasonable scale factor with which to multiply the GDP series. I use data from
the US United States Department of Commerce ((1935 - 1937) of the interwar period and data from
in particular the value-to-weight ratio.
22This is based on unit values; see (League of Nations, 1938, Table 1).
23Deflation also increases the effective tariff rate. Whether real freight rates increase more than the effective tariff
rate depends on the stickiness of nominal freight rates and the rate at which tariffs increase in the respective sector.
24Indeed Bulgaria’s GDP is smaller than her total exports for all years in the sample, which means that using GDP
as a proxy of gross output would result in negative internal trade.
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Federico (2004) to calculate average gross output to value added ratios for the U.S. manufacturing
sector and international agricultural sector, and calculate internal trade as follows:25
Xiit = Yit[(1− s1,t − s2,t) + (s1,t ∗ vAgri,t) + (s2,t ∗ vManuf,t)]−Xit (A.1)
In the above equation, Yit is country i’s GDP in year t. s1,t and s2,t are the global average
shares of the primary and secondary sectors, which I take from Fouquin and Hugot (2016b). vAgri,t
and vManuf,t are the average ratios of gross output over value added. On average this yields a scale
factor of 1.4. Xit is total exports and is taken from Fouquin and Hugot (2016b) for all countries but
Yugoslavia. Total exports for Yugoslavia come from (Mitchell, 1998, p.580).26
In sections (3.2) and (3.3) I include a set of dummy variables that indicate whether two countries
are on the gold standard or are members of the same trade or currency bloc. Data for the time on
gold comes from Eichengreen (1992) and bloc membership is taken from Gowa and Hicks (2013).
Finally, I include a set of standard gravity covariates (distance, contiguity, common language,
colonial linkage). I use the existing data on these variables in Fouquin and Hugot’s (2016b) dataset,
which I supplement with the CEPII distance dataset from Mayer and Zignago (2011) for any missing
observations. As a measure of distance, I use population-weighted distance. The contiguity dummy
is equal to one if two countries share a common border. If they do not, it is zero. The language
dummy takes the value one if at least 9% of the population speaks the same language and zero
otherwise. The colonial dummy indicates whether they were ever in a colonial relationship.
25The data to calculate gross output to value added ratios for the manufacturing sector is taken from Inklaar et al.
(2011). As this data is biennial, I use the same data point for two consecutive years. Federico’s (2004) table D.1.
provides data on indices for gross output and value added for the worldwide agricultural sector.




This subsection presents a battery of robustness and sensitivity checks. Many more specifications
were tried and I present only the most relevant ones. Table (A.3) shows the estimation results
for additional econometric specifications of equation (3.6). Columns (1) - (3) are a reproduction
of column (2) in table (1), but include asymmetric pair fixed effects, a time trend interacted with
the pair fixed effects, and both. The inclusion of pair-trends causes collinearity with country-pair
specific variables. In my specifications most variation over time of the individual country-pairs is
already captured by the distance and border variables. In column (2) Stata drops the coefficient on
lnDistij,1937 and fails to create standard errors for the coefficient on INTL BRDRij,1937. In column
(3) Stata drops both regressors entirely. Accordingly, the remaining coefficients should be interpreted
differently. One way to think about the remaining coefficients on lnDistij,t and INTL BRDRij,t
in columns (2) and (3) is that they should be interpreted as deviations from a trend. Given this
interpretation, the main results concerning the border and distance elasticities is considered robust.
Columns (4) to (6) show the main specification and the solution to the interwar distance puz-
zle without using pair fixed effects. Instead, I include the standard gravity covariates contiguity,
colonial and commonlanguage. The coefficient on lnDistij,1925 in column (4) is not significantly
different from the coefficient on lnDistij,1937. However, once we exclude sterling bloc and IPS mem-
bership from the regression, the distance puzzle reappears.
We also observe a very large and increasing border effect in the regressions without pair fixed
effects. The estimate in column (4) for example implies that, all else being equal, international
borders decreased trade by an average of 100 ∗ (eβ2,1928 − 1) = 100 ∗ (e−4.869 − 1) = 99% in 1928.
While this coefficient is larger than comparable coefficients for the present period, it is close to the
coefficient estimated by Fouquin and Hugot (2016a) for the interwar period.27 Given the much higher
level of protectionism in the 1920s and 1930s, it is not surprising to find a larger border effect. Yet
there might be bilateral factors not controlled for in columns (4) - (6) that bias the absolute value of
the coefficients on distance and border. However, for my counterfactual analysis the absolute value
is of little relevance if one assumes a constant elasticity of trade to trade costs. What matters is how
these individual trade costs change over time and the change in the distance and border variables is
not qualitatively different if I include pair fixed effects. For example, multiplying the coefficient on
INTL BRDRij,1925 in column (4), table (A.3) with the estimate on INTL BRDRij,1937 in column
(2), table (1) yields a coefficient of -5.285 (ln (e−4.652 ∗ e−0.633)), which is larger than the -5.151
obtained in column (4) here.
Finally, note that the indicator variables for gold standard adherence, sterling bloc and IPS
membership are significantly larger than in the regressions with pair fixed effects. Not controlling
for potential endogeneity and unobserved country-pair heterogeneity drastically increases these co-
efficients, confirming the view of Bergstrand et al. (2015) that not including pair fixed effects biases
the coefficient on economic integration agreements.
Table (A.4) presents the results for additional specifications of estimating equation (3.6). Column
27Yotov et al. (2016) find a coefficient of −2.474 for the year 2006. Fouquin and Hugot (2016a) do not present
results in table form, but their figure 12 suggests that the coefficient on international borders varied between −4.5
and −6 during the interwar period.
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Table A.3: Regression Estimates: Robustness
Horse Race
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PPML PPML PPML PPML PPML PPML
VARIABLES Xij Xij Xij Xij Xij Xij
ln(Distij,1925) -0.425*** -0.426*** -0.404***
(0.0693) (0.0696) (0.0686)
ln(Distij,1928) -0.0155 -0.0259** -0.0211* -0.435*** -0.436*** -0.441***
(0.0124) (0.0118) (0.0121) (0.0651) (0.0654) (0.0665)
ln(Distij,1931) -0.0714** -0.0980*** -0.0898** -0.535*** -0.496*** -0.502***
(0.0283) (0.0375) (0.0365) (0.0661) (0.0701) (0.0690)
ln(Distij,1934) 0.0317 -0.0190 -0.0154 -0.438*** -0.335*** -0.348***
(0.0283) (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0632) (0.0729) (0.0716)
ln(Distij,1937) 0.0524 -0.426*** -0.318*** -0.309***
(0.0365) (0.0676) (0.0778) (0.0773)
INTL BRDRij,1925 -4.652*** -4.689*** -4.628***
(0.158) (0.160) (0.157)
INTL BRDRij,1928 -0.0623* 0.0793** 0.168*** -4.869*** -4.894*** -4.614***
(0.0365) (0.0345) (0.0348) (0.164) (0.167) (0.151)
INTL BRDRij,1931 -0.291*** -0.0597 0.116 -5.028*** -5.094*** -4.809***
(0.0687) (0.0973) (0.0949) (0.152) (0.159) (0.154)
INTL BRDRij,1934 -0.672*** -0.432*** -0.161*** -5.247*** -5.360*** -5.319***
(0.0691) (0.0367) (0.0371) (0.150) (0.165) (0.161)
INTL BRDRij,1937 -0.630*** -0.363 -5.155*** -5.275*** -5.302***
(0.0925) (0) (0.164) (0.183) (0.183)
Contiguityij 0.515*** 0.528*** 0.548***
(0.0767) (0.0809) (0.0833)
Colonialij 0.933*** 1.012*** 1.001***
(0.0904) (0.0945) (0.0945)
CommonLanguageij -0.0180 0.0501 0.0746
(0.0607) (0.0627) (0.0616)
Goldij 0.0838** -0.0142 -0.0132 0.353*** 0.334***
(0.0333) (0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0763) (0.0785)
SterlingBlocij 0.127 0.106 0.123* 0.713***
(0.0784) (0.0714) (0.0719) (0.112)
IPSij 0.202** 0.418*** 0.437*** 0.643***
(0.0894) (0.0955) (0.0935) (0.153)
Observations 5,075 5,085 5,075 5,085 5,085 5,085
Country Pair FE’s Yes Yes Yes No No No
Asymmetric Pair FE’s Yes No Yes No No No
Time trend No Yes Yes No No No
Notes: All estimates are obtained with data for the years 1925, 1928, 1931, 1934 and 1937, and use
exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects. The estimates of fixed effects are omitted for brevity.
Standard errors are clustered by country pair in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(1) simply reproduces column (7) in table (1) excluding Distij,t from the regression. The sterling
bloc is now significant at the 10% level and all other coefficients are similar in magnitude to those in
column (7) of table (1). Dropping the gold standard dummy (column (2)) reduces the significance of
the sterling bloc, but adding three-year lag variables and the gold standard dummy increases its size
and significance (column (3)). The coefficient on sterling bloc also remains significant when I use
four-year lag variables (column (4)) or add Distij,t again to the regression (column (5)). Column (5)
in particular is a reproduction of column (2) in table (1) extended to account for phasing-in effects
of the bloc dummies. The fact that the sterling bloc is now significant is taken as justification of its
use in the trade cost function.
Finally, table (A.5) reproduces the most important regressions with data for all 13 years. Column
(1), for example, is the same specification as in columns (1) and (2) in table (1). All coefficients
are comparable in size and significance and the significance of the sterling bloc is even increased
by adding all years. Moreover, columns (5) to (6) again show that the interwar distance puzzle is
resolved once we include IPS and sterling bloc membership. This result is robust to the inclusion of
asymmetric pair fixed effects. Again, the inclusion of a time trend causes collinearity problems and
the coefficients on INTL BRDRij,1937 and Distij,1937 are dropped in the specifications in columns
(3) and (4). The interpretation of the remaining coefficients should change accordingly.
33
Table A.4: Regression Estimates: Blocs lagged
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PPML PPML PPML PPML PPML









INTL BRDRij,1928 -0.106*** -0.0533*** -0.127*** -0.103*** -0.0828*
(0.0201) (0.0155) (0.0302) (0.0223) (0.0440)
INTL BRDRij,1931 -0.447*** -0.396*** -0.491*** -0.435*** -0.338***
(0.0309) (0.0276) (0.0475) (0.0455) (0.0803)
INTL BRDRij,1934 -0.607*** -0.638*** -0.645*** -0.597*** -0.721***
(0.0352) (0.0353) (0.0391) (0.0462) (0.0755)
INTL BRDRij,1937 -0.520*** -0.558*** -0.518*** -0.520*** -0.638***
(0.0392) (0.0405) (0.0399) (0.0398) (0.0949)
Goldij 0.107*** 0.117*** 0.104*** 0.0996**
(0.0326) (0.0378) (0.0368) (0.0393)
Goldij,t−3 0.0453 0.0496
(0.0321) (0.0315)
SterlingBlocij,t 0.125* 0.0983 0.132* 0.105* 0.163**
(0.0725) (0.0675) (0.0788) (0.0632) (0.0763)
SterlingBlocij,t−3 0.0182 -0.00232 -0.0698
(0.0725) (0.0739) (0.0744)
IPSij,t 0.272*** 0.272*** 0.298*** 0.290*** 0.267***
(0.0757) (0.0884) (0.0877) (0.0542) (0.0929)








Observations 5,085 5,085 5,085 5,085 5,085
Country Pair Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All estimates are obtained with data for the years 1925, 1928, 1931, 1934 and 1937, and use exporter-
time, importer-time and pair fixed effects. The estimates of fixed effects are omitted for brevity. Standard
errors are clustered by country pair in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.5: Regression Estimates: No Intervall
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PPML PPML PPML PPML PPML PPML PPML
VARIABLES Xij Xij Xij Xij Xij Xij Xij
ln(Distij,1926) -0.0239*** -0.0175** -0.0329*** -0.0265*** -0.0188** -0.0268*** -0.0287***
(0.00860) (0.00860) (0.00838) (0.00857) (0.00848) (0.00848) (0.00830)
ln(Distij,1927) -0.0203** -0.0159 -0.0260** -0.0213* -0.0150 -0.0219** -0.0199*
(0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0102) (0.0101) (0.0102)
ln(Distij,1928) -0.0192 -0.0144 -0.0301*** -0.0239** -0.0139 -0.0208* -0.0215
(0.0123) (0.0126) (0.0113) (0.0116) (0.0126) (0.0123) (0.0132)
ln(Distij,1929) -0.0303** -0.0257* -0.0443*** -0.0370** -0.0250* -0.0318** -0.0321**
(0.0130) (0.0132) (0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0130)
ln(Distij,1930) -0.0837*** -0.0777*** -0.107*** -0.0963*** -0.0783*** -0.0865*** -0.0932***
(0.0216) (0.0208) (0.0290) (0.0280) (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0208)
ln(Distij,1931) -0.0797*** -0.0731*** -0.0956** -0.0843** -0.0619** -0.0697*** -0.0767***
(0.0278) (0.0272) (0.0373) (0.0361) (0.0256) (0.0257) (0.0249)
ln(Distij,1932) -0.0359 -0.0313 -0.0624** -0.0532** -0.0242 -0.00268 -0.00247
(0.0231) (0.0232) (0.0246) (0.0244) (0.0225) (0.0217) (0.0218)
ln(Distij,1933) 0.00492 0.00649 -0.0319 -0.0257 0.0144 0.0363* 0.0355*
(0.0222) (0.0227) (0.0198) (0.0199) (0.0221) (0.0213) (0.0215)
ln(Distij,1934) 0.0290 0.0321 -0.0117 -0.00398 0.0431 0.0657** 0.0636**
(0.0277) (0.0282) (0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0280) (0.0273) (0.0278)
ln(Distij,1935) 0.0479 0.0501 0.00304 0.00888 0.0625* 0.0859*** 0.0842***
(0.0320) (0.0328) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0326) (0.0318) (0.0325)
ln(Distij,1936) 0.0418 0.0436 -0.00631 -0.00257 0.0564 0.0805** 0.0804*
(0.0400) (0.0405) (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0414)
ln(Distij,1937) 0.0531 0.0541 0.0673* 0.0916** 0.0922**
(0.0365) (0.0366) (0.0369) (0.0362) (0.0372)
INTL BRDRij,1926 -0.0263 -0.0390* 0.0568*** 0.0467** -0.0365* -0.0188 -0.00904
(0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0213) (0.0216) (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0204)
INTL BRDRij,1927 -0.0307 -0.0385 0.107*** 0.103*** -0.0406 -0.0222 -0.00791
(0.0271) (0.0269) (0.0289) (0.0288) (0.0271) (0.0269) (0.0248)
INTL BRDRij,1928 -0.0476 -0.0558 0.160*** 0.155*** -0.0573* -0.0366 -0.00863
(0.0341) (0.0344) (0.0317) (0.0321) (0.0348) (0.0350) (0.0335)
INTL BRDRij,1929 -0.0258 -0.0332 0.237*** 0.232*** -0.0354 -0.0149 0.0122
(0.0342) (0.0342) (0.0441) (0.0436) (0.0345) (0.0345) (0.0322)
INTL BRDRij,1930 -0.104** -0.114** 0.221*** 0.212*** -0.114** -0.0917* -0.0544
(0.0517) (0.0501) (0.0757) (0.0734) (0.0511) (0.0513) (0.0477)
INTL BRDRij,1931 -0.267*** -0.279*** 0.0997 0.0891 -0.292*** -0.269*** -0.230***
(0.0645) (0.0627) (0.0975) (0.0949) (0.0615) (0.0617) (0.0587)
INTL BRDRij,1932 -0.509*** -0.521*** -0.126** -0.134** -0.529*** -0.547*** -0.560***
(0.0536) (0.0528) (0.0611) (0.0602) (0.0528) (0.0534) (0.0518)
INTL BRDRij,1933 -0.604*** -0.610*** -0.148*** -0.151*** -0.614*** -0.632*** -0.645***
(0.0533) (0.0533) (0.0506) (0.0503) (0.0537) (0.0546) (0.0542)
INTL BRDRij,1934 -0.671*** -0.680*** -0.162*** -0.169*** -0.687*** -0.707*** -0.720***
(0.0683) (0.0689) (0.0374) (0.0375) (0.0698) (0.0710) (0.0719)
INTL BRDRij,1935 -0.759*** -0.766*** -0.201*** -0.206*** -0.775*** -0.797*** -0.811***
(0.0798) (0.0812) (0.0273) (0.0275) (0.0816) (0.0829) (0.0848)
INTL BRDRij,1936 -0.742*** -0.749*** -0.141*** -0.145*** -0.759*** -0.783*** -0.802***
(0.103) (0.104) (0.0256) (0.0263) (0.105) (0.107) (0.109)
INTL BRDRij,1937 -0.638*** -0.643*** -0.654*** -0.679*** -0.701***
(0.0928) (0.0928) (0.0942) (0.0961) (0.0988)
Goldij,t 0.0691** 0.0657** 0.0121 0.0127 0.0671** 0.0545*
(0.0272) (0.0265) (0.0172) (0.0171) (0.0273) (0.0279)
SterlingBlocij,t 0.129* 0.132* 0.0188 0.0204
(0.0722) (0.0764) (0.0506) (0.0522)
IPSij,t 0.202** 0.209** 0.327*** 0.332*** 0.271***
(0.0964) (0.0943) (0.0716) (0.0718) (0.0819)
Observations 13,143 13,130 13,143 13,130 13,143 13,143 13,143
Asymetric Pair FE’s No Yes No Yes No No No
Time trend No No Yes Yes No No No
Notes: All estimates are obtained with data for all years from 1925 to 1937, and use exporter-time, importer-time
and pair fixed effects. The estimates of fixed effects are omitted for brevity. Robust standard errors, clustered by
country pair, are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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A.3 General Equilibrium Appendix
This section briefly explains the techniques used to calculate GE effects. A more detailed discussion
is found in Yotov et al. (2016) or in the Stata code that accompanies this paper (available upon
request).
After having implemented the two-stage procedure by Anderson and Yotov (2016) and having
obtained the complete set of bilateral trade costs τBLNij,1937, I estimate the gravity model in equation
(3.1) as follows:







The estimates of the importer fixed effects (δBLNj ) and of the exporter fixed effects (γ
BLN
i ) from
















where, output is constructed as Yi =
∑N
j=1




EDEU is expenditure of the reference country, Germany, for which the inward MR is normalized to
one and the corresponding fixed effect δDEU is removed from regression (A.2). The predicted volume




for all j 6= i). The computation for the counterfactual MRs and trade volumes is analogous.28 The
conditional GE effects are calculated as the difference, in percentage, between the baseline and the
counterfactual trade volumes.
The full endowment GE effects are obtained by implementing a four-step iterative procedure.
First, I use the market-clearing condition in (3.4) to translate the conditional GE effects on the
multilateral resistance terms into first-order changes in factory-gate prices, by applying the definition











In the second step output and expenditure respond endogenously to the above change in factory










j . This in turn will trigger additional
changes in the multilateral resistance terms and so forth. The structural gravity equation (3.1)























Equation (A.6) computes a counterfactual value of trade that accounts for changes in output and
expenditure, via a change in the factory gate price, and changes in inward and outward multilateral
28Note that for the calculation of the counterfactual MRs the original data on output and expenditure is used. The
conditional GE values of the MRs under the counterfactual scenario are then calculated analogous to equations (A.3)
and (A.4) but use the fixed effects γˆCFi and δˆ
CF
j from estimating equation (3.9).
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resistances. Yet, these changes are only first-order changes, because they only capture the changes
in the conditional outward multilateral resistances and the immediate response in the factory-gate
prices.
Hence, the third stage of the loop reestimates the gravity model (3.9) with the new value of bilat-
eral trade, XCFij,1937 from equation (A.6), and then computes the corresponding GE effects associated
with the new fixed effect estimates. The idea is to update the value of bilateral trade to obtain
additional responses in the multilateral resistances and in the values of output and expenditure.
Once the new set of fixed effects associated with the new value of trade from equation (A.6) are
estimated, the loop starts again at the first stage of the iterative procedure in order to obtain a
new set of factory gate prices associated with these fixed effects. These three steps are repeated
until the change in each of the factory gate prices is close to zero and the model has reached its
new equilibrium. The difference in percentage between the baseline and the new equilibrium trade
volumes yields the full endowment GE effect.
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A.4 Transport Costs Appendix
Figure (A.2) plots the real freight rates of all 21 routes over time. In general, all routes move
together, which is due to nominal freight rates changing very slowly and in tandem across routes.
Most of the changes in real freight rates is then caused by the change in the price of cotton. This
indicates that there has indeed been a significant degree of cartelization in the liner industry. As
discussed above, tramp and liner shipping differ in their way of operation. Prices for tramp shipping
are usually set in spot markets and tramps are hired on a charter basis. Liners run on fixed routes
and fixed timetables, which makes the industry potentially more susceptible to cartelization. Indeed,
the liner industry of the post-war period is organized into conferences, which discuss, and perhaps
collude in, setting prices and market shares (Hummels, 2007).
Figure A.2: Cotton Ad-Valorem Freight Rates from New York to 21 Destinations
[Print in Color]
Notes: The graph shows cotton (American middling) freight rates for 21 routes deflated by the price at the place of
origin (New York). Sources: Commercial and Financial Chronicle (1925 - 1936) and Statistisches Reichsamt (1936).
Following Hummels (1999, 2007) and Estevadeordal et al. (2003) I can estimate the technological
relationship between distance and transport costs with a simple OLS regression
ln (fn,t) = α+ β ln (Distn,t) +Dt + n,t (A.7)
where fn,t is the ad-valorem freight, Distn,t is great circle distance between ports and Dt is an
optional time dummy. Table (A.6) shows the regression results with and without time dummies for
all years and for the pre and post-depression periods.
The coefficients on distance in column (1) and (2) are significantly larger than those obtained
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Table A.6: Technology in the Interwar Liner Shipping Industry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
VARIABLES ln (fn,t) ln (fn,t) ln (fn,t) ln (fn,t) ln (fn,t) ln (fn,t)
ln (Distn,t) 0.397*** 0.499*** 0.415*** 0.467*** 0.320*** 0.440***
(0.0374) (0.0186) (0.0482) (0.0280) (0.0436) (0.0188)
Constant -6.530*** -7.390*** -6.466*** -7.123*** -5.887*** -6.742***
(0.312) (0.164) (0.401) (0.240) (0.363) (0.164)
Observations 2,751 2,751 1,635 1,635 2,204 2,204
R-squared 0.039 0.778 0.043 0.697 0.024 0.829
Time Dummy No Yes No Yes No Yes
Years All All 1927-1929 1927-1929 1934-1936 1934-1936
Notes: The distance between New York and 21 port cities is taken from https://www.distance-cities.com/
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
by Hummels (1999, 2007) for the post-war period, which one would expect given the technological
improvements such as containerization.29 When I estimate equation (A.7) for the period between
May 1927 and May 1929 the elasticity of ocean transportation to distance is 0.415 (column (3)),
but drops to 0.32 for the period May 1934 and May 1936. This drop is still apparent, although
somewhat smaller when I include time fixed effects. This result suggests that, if anything, there was
technological improvement in the shipping sector during the interwar period.
29Note, however, that Hummels (1999, 2007) includes a value to weight ratio in his regressions. This is not possible
here, since I only consider one good.
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